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SO: This is Dr Sue Onslow talking to Sir Shridath Ramphal, Secretary 
General of the Commonwealth between 1975 and 1990. Sir, thank you 
very much indeed for agreeing to talk to me. I wondered if you could 
begin, please, by describing how you came to be selected and elected 
as Secretary General. 
 
SR: It really is a strange story, because I did not come to it through ambition. I had 
become very active as Foreign Minister of Guyana on the international scene 
– and, indeed, on the Commonwealth scene – because, in 1971, four years 
before I became Secretary General, I was involved in the Singapore 
[Commonwealth Heads of Government] conference. This was a bit of a 
debacle because of Ted Heath and the Simonstown Agreement and arms 
sales to South Africa. It was there, of course, [that] we produced the 
Singapore Declaration, which was the first organic document of the 
Commonwealth. In Singapore, the people who worked on that document were 
Mark Chona of Zambia, Ivan Head of Canada and myself. We drafted it and 
others titivated with it, but it meant that I had a good deal of prominence at the 
Commonwealth level there. Within a year, I was chairing the meeting of Non-
Aligned Foreign Ministers in Guyana. It was quite a sensational meeting 
because it was the first time the Non-Aligned Movement had met at any 
political level in the Western hemisphere – outside New York, at the UN – and 
it was a big coup. It was a difficult time in non-alignment. There were deep 
problems dividing the movement over Sihanouk and Cambodia, and, as well, 
over the admission to full membership of the Non-Aligned Movement of the 
‘Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam’ – the PRG. As you 
can imagine, those divisions were along Cold War lines, and the threat was 
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that the movement would break up. So, the Foreign Ministers’ meeting in 
Georgetown became absolutely pivotal. I, in the Chair, had the job of steering 
it out of these murky waters. Well, what can I tell you? It was a success. The 
Chair was hailed as having been crucial in this. 
 
SO: How did you manage that? 
 
SR: [Laughter] With a good deal of footwork and the help of a lot of people, and 
getting the trust of people. I had, for example, to get the trust of the Algerians 
and of [Abdelaziz] Bouteflika, in particular. Bouteflika is a fighter. So, when I 
pleaded with him to follow my strategy of not bringing it to the table, he said, 
“You’re asking me to demobilise? [Laughter] My forces are ready!” And I said, 
“Yes, I am. You have to trust me.” Eventually we did by getting Prime Minister 
Burnham to be in touch with the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka. This was over an 
issue of the venue of the next meeting, which Mrs Bandaranaike [of Sri 
Lanka] wanted as a memorial to her assassinated husband, and which 
Boumediene [of Algeria] wanted as a monument to his leadership of the Non-
Aligned Movement. So, we had deep personal problems, but then the 
movement divided along Cold War alliances. 
 
SO: So, there wasn’t a Commonwealth group within the NAM? 
 
SR: No, there wasn’t. It had nothing to do with the Commonwealth. What it meant 
in terms of me and the Commonwealth was that two years later, in 1974, 
when the issue of a successor to the Secretary General of the 
Commonwealth arose, my name came to the surface almost automatically – 
because of these antecedent activities. 
 
SO: You’d won your spurs? 
 
SR: [Laughter] I’d won them, but without meaning to. The way it all emerged was 
that we had a High Commissioner in London called Sir John Carter, and he 
was an urbane, kindly man – my elder. The High Commissioners began 
talking among themselves – as they kept tending to do – about the 
succession. Arnold [Smith] hadn’t indicated that he was going for a third term 
or that he wasn’t. I think he was himself thinking about it. But the High 
Commissioners began to think about this. What happened next was that I got 
a telephone call from John Carter – I was in Georgetown – saying, “Look, this 
is what’s been happening. The High Commissioners have been talking, your 
name has popped up, and I am at a loss. I don’t know what to say: you’ve 
never talked to me about this.” He was clearly quite expectant. I was 
dumbstruck! I said, “Look, I need time; I need to think.” He said, “But I have to 
do something. They’re pressing me to find out if you would be willing.” And I 
said, “Well, I can’t tell you that I’m willing, but take the temperature on the 
basis that I might be, without any commitment that I am.” He called me back 
in two days – there are some conversations you remember very vividly – [and] 
he said, “Minister, you asked me to take the temperature. I’ve done so. It’s a 
forest fire!” 
 
SO: What a wonderful analogy! 
 
SR: [Laughter] And so it just went from that. The next thing was [that] the British 
Press were saying, “It’s a shoe-in for Sonny Ramphal.” Arnold went and 
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talked in Ottawa and came back – he wasn’t one hundred percent well – and 
he said, “I’m not standing.” 
 
SO: Do you think the Canadians were somewhat nonplussed that, after all, 
‘their’ man was not going to go for that third term? 
 
SR: I don’t think, at that stage, they any longer regarded him as ‘their’ man. 
Remember I told you about Ivan Head and Singapore? They felt Canada had 
done ten years. It was time for a developing country, and they knew Sonny 
Ramphal by then. 
 
SO: What of India’s role? I’m thinking of its leading role in the Non-Aligned 
Movement, and wonder whether this was of critical importance. 
 
SR: It was important to me because, as the biggest country in the 
Commonwealth…were they going to show an interest? In any case, I was 
sufficiently close to Indira Gandhi in the Non-Aligned Movement [and so 
could] not do this without talking to her. I talked to her. She was a little 
uncertain – not about my credentials but about the loss to Non-Alignment. Her 
line was, “Look, you’re doing so well for us as Foreign Minister of Guyana on 
the world stage. Do you think it’s the best thing for you to go [to] this rather 
old-fashioned institution?” 
 
SO: So, she felt it would be very much a demotion for you – that you would 
be going to a backwater? 
 
SR: Not so much a demotion for me, but a loss for her – a loss to things that she 
regarded as more important than the Commonwealth. I said, “Well, you know, 
I’ve thought about that but the Commonwealth, after all, is now 80% 
developing countries. It is what Nehru hoped it would be.” I pulled a little at 
those heart strings [Jawaharlal Nehru was Indira Gandhi’s father]. She 
thought about it and she said, “You know, you may have a point. But if you go 
there, you’ve got to shake it up.” And those were words that you don’t forget. 
 
SO: So, where did you have this discussion? 
 
SR: In Georgetown, prior to the Kingston meeting. “You’ve got to shake it up.” 
 
SO: Did you ask for advice from any other key leaders? 
 
SR: Not really. The Guyanese Prime Minister, Forbes Burnham, then got behind 
my candidature, as he had to. I couldn’t go forward without that. He wrote to 
all the leaders, but his strengths were with the African leaders: he brought 
them on board. And they knew me, too, from Non-Alignment. So, I didn’t have 
to do an awful lot of canvassing. 
 
SO: Do you know how the British government felt? 
 
SR: I don’t know. I think – going back to those letters between Harold Wilson and 
Pierre Trudeau - they felt relaxed. They felt they knew me. They probably 
didn’t approve of a lot of the Non-Aligned stuff. They were not going to 
oppose a Third World candidate who, they had begun to recognise, had great 
support. 
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SO: Was there anyone else in the running before the Kingston CHOGM? 
 
SR: No, except this little thing on the side about Milton Obote, which I only 
discovered in the Wilson-Trudeau letters. Idi Amin – who had staged a coup 
against Obote during the Singapore meeting, in early ‘74 – floated the idea in 
a letter to Wilson of his nominating Obote to the soon-to-be-vacant position of 
Secretary General! [Laughter] 
 
SO: What a wonderful way to get rid of a political opponent! 
 
SR: Indeed! And, you know, by then Amin was beginning to show all the signs of 
being an ogre, but he had access to the British government. I will never forget 
[that] the first capital Amin visited after the coup was London [and] the first 
Prime Minister he saw after the coup was Ted Heath. So, there was an 
access there. At that stage, it was more important to Britain to get rid of Obote 
– who was a thorn in their side – than face Amin. But, of course, they never 
really knew how bad Amin was, really, with the Third World. 
 
SO: Indeed, a choice between two evils rather than the lesser of two evils. 
 
SR: Right. So, that was the only other mention. It got nowhere, and it was 
dropped. There was never a suggestion of Obote even knowing anything 
about it. No African leaders came up and said, “Vote for Milton Obote!” So, I 
was elected unopposed, basically, at Kingston. The Kingston CHOGM was 
Arnold’s last meeting. 
 
SO: What was the background to that meeting? Obviously there were the 
formal issues on the agenda, and then there were discussions around 
the edges. 
 
SR: Well, there was a big economic debate. Arnold had developed a very wise 
system of organising keynote speakers who would lead off the discussion: it 
was [about] world economic issues, it was at a time of the New International 
Economic Order (NIEO), it was big stuff at the UN. He chose Harold Wilson to 
lead off for the developed countries and Forbes Burnham – my Prime Minister 
– to lead off for the developing countries. So, the meeting got off to a start, if 
you like, with these very strongly contending views between Burnham and 
Wilson. Not acrimonious, but good intellectual stuff. That keynote led to the 
first of my expert groups, because it decided on an expert group on the New 
International Economic Order. It was chaired by Sir Alister McIntyre and we 
never looked back. 
 
SO: Sir, much of the literature on the Commonwealth – and, indeed, the 
press headlines of the 1970s and, of course, the 1980s – focuses upon 
Rhodesia/Zimbabwe and South Africa. Did the Commonwealth under 
your Secretary Generalship develop a particular approach to how you 
managed liberation movements such as the Patriotic Front in 
Rhodesia/Zimbabwe and the ANC in South Africa? 
 
SR: It wasn’t a big choice for me because I came to the job as Foreign Minister of 
a country that was leading its region in support of these liberation movements: 
making contributions to the ANC, publically supporting the Patriotic Front in 
Rhodesia, leading the anti-apartheid effort on isolating South Africa in sport 
and sanctions, generally. So, that was my background. 
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SO: Specifically, did the Patriotic Front feature in any way at the Kingston 
meeting in 1975 or at the subsequent London meeting in 1977? 
Because, obviously, the 1979 Lusaka meeting was about 
Rhodesia/Zimbabwe… 
 
SR: [Laughter] It featured at Kingston in an unorthodox way, because Arnold 
would never have organised – or allowed to be organised – what did, in fact, 
take place, which was that Michael Manley, who was then striking a very 
radical pose in Jamaica and in the Third World generally, took it upon himself 
to invite the ‘liberation’ leaders Joshua Nkomo, Bishop Muzorewa and Chief 
Sithole of the early African National Front to be his personal guests in 
Kingston, on the occasion of the CHOGM meeting. What I’m sure he told 
them was, “You leave it to me. I’m going to find a way for you to talk to the 
Heads.” Now, this was not on the cards in terms of the agenda, or [for] the 
Secretariat. But Manley did this. It was a secret – even that they were there 
was a secret. He told the Heads at an early session that they were there and 
[that] this would be a great opportunity for the Commonwealth to meet with 
them quietly – to hear from them. And, of course, it would have been a 
fantastic opportunity for the ‘liberation’ leaders. 
 
SO: An incomparable opportunity, yes. 
 
SR: [Laughter] They would never even come within touching distance of the non-
African membership. Most of the leaders were quite relaxed about that, but 
Trudeau of Canada was not. 
 
SO: In 1975, Harold Wilson was still Prime Minister of the UK. Was he 
relaxed about that? 
 
SR: He was quiet, as Britain had been on most of those situations. The whole of 
the Round Table was quite happy, so he wasn’t going to be the one to make 
the fuss. He would have joined the fuss. The person who did make the fuss 
was Pierre Trudeau – who was, in other respects, supportive of the Patriotic 
Front. However, Trudeau was a man of considerable principle. He took 
objection to being “hijacked”, as he described it. He didn’t leave the meeting 
when Michael brought Nkomo and the others in, but he very publicly and 
deliberately turned his nameplate ‘CANADA’ upside down and reminded 
Michael that this was not an official part of the Heads of Government meeting. 
Yet, he stayed. 
 
SO: Did he? So, his demonstration didn’t include walking out? 
 
SR: No, his demonstration was turning his nameplate over. I suspect that he – like 
everybody else – was keen to see and hear who these guys were. 
 
SO: Who led the discussion thereafter? 
 
SR: Michael invited Bishop Muzorewa to talk, and they talked at a ‘non-session’ of 
the meeting. 
 
SO: Do you remember if anyone was putting particular questions or 
pressing a particular line? 
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SR: No, I can’t really say that I remember the discussion. It was less of a 
discussion, as I recall it, than a presentation. Of course, there’s no record of 
the meeting, [Laughter] because it wasn’t an official part [of the CHOGM].  
 
SO: So, what was the feeling after Nkomo and the others had left? Was there 
a general discussion? 
 
SR: Well, I think it was a favourable discussion, because, bear in mind, most of 
the people around the table were supporting them. All the Africans, all the 
Caribbean people, [and] most of the Asians were in their camp. It was people 
like the Australians, the Canadians, [and] the New Zealanders for whom this 
was a revelation. The ‘liberation’ leaders weren’t terrorists; they weren’t ogres. 
They came across very well. That was the real element of my own 
introduction to the ‘liberation’ leaders. When I actually came to the 
Commonwealth Secretary Generalship, I therefore had met some of them at 
Kingston – though not yet Mugabe – and I very quickly made contact with 
them. 
 
SO: Did you maintain that contact? 
 
SR: I did. Right through, right through. 
 
SO: All the way through from 1975? 
 
SR: Absolutely. 
 
SO: So, what of the London meeting in 1977? Was there an element of the 
Liberation Forces – as they then were – contacting you to present a 
particular agenda? 
 
SR: Yes, they contacted me to that effect, but it was usually on the basis that the 
Contact Group of African countries would be presenting and I would be 
facilitating the presentation. They acted not so much through the Secretary 
General as through the African Contact Group, which was Kenneth Kaunda 
and Julius Nyerere, essentially. But, with a friendly Secretary General, an 
environment to the meeting [was created] that was supportive. 
 
SO: In 1976, Henry Kissinger put forward his ‘Africa initiative’, when he and 
the then British Foreign Secretary Anthony Crosland attempted to 
forcibly encourage Ian Smith to accelerate black majority rule, and there 
was that ‘squeeze play’ that involved the South Africans. Were you in 
any way kept informed of this particular angle of diplomacy? 
 
SR: No, no. 
 
SO: So, you weren’t involved in any of the discussions around the need for a 
development fund? 
 
SR: I knew of it. I was told of it, but I was not invited to play a role in it. Indeed, as I 
sensed the mood from the Foreign Office, it was, “You don’t…” [Laughter] 
 
SO: Ah. “This is our patch”? 
 
SR: “This is our responsibility”. 
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SO: Yes. Did you, in any way, have a watching brief with the Geneva 
discussions [on Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, chaired by Ivor Richards] between 
October 1976 and January 1977? 
 
SR: No, I didn’t. The British were very keen – the Foreign Office, in particular, 
[and] Peter Carrington in 1979 was representative of that mood – to keep the 
Secretariat out of it. 
 
SO: Was this also the attitude and behaviour of Anthony Crosland and David 
Owen during their respective terms as British Foreign Secretary? 
 
SR: Yes, but Crosland and Owen – and Owen in particular – were more friendly 
about it. He was not hostile to the Secretariat. For example, there were four 
African delegations at the Geneva discussions. The Secretariat provided 
technical assistance to each, and my then Assistant Secretary General 
Emeka Anyaoku was in Geneva throughout. 
 
SO: Were you kept briefed about the Owen-Vance discussions? 
 
SR: Yes, I knew much more about those. In the first place, I had a good personal 
relationship with both Cyrus Vance and David Owen. They didn’t want me to 
get in their way, but they weren’t hostile. 
 
SO: Were you in any way aware of David Owen’s attempts at secret 
diplomacy? His reaching out to expand the Internal Settlement, to 
include Joshua Nkomo…? 
 
SR: Yes, I was… 
 
SO: In what way? 
 
SR: …and I welcomed it. 
 
SO: Yes. You were aware of it? Or were you in any way involved in... 
 
SR: No, I wasn’t involved with it. They really wanted it to be their own thing. 
 
SO: Were you in touch with the Nigerians – as well as the Tanzanians and 
the Zambians – about this particular aspect? 
 
SR: That’s right. 
 
SO: Ah, so, you were the recipient of a number of different confidences? 
 
SR: Yes. At that stage, it wasn’t hostility to the Secretariat; it was, “We’ll keep you 
informed,” and that was fine. 
 
SO: Did you express an opinion when President Nyerere effectively put the 
brakes on General Garba’s attempt to broker the deal with Smith? 
 
SR: I can’t remember whether I expressed an opinion, but I was with Nyerere – I 
was on Nyerere’s side in doing that. 
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SO: Do you mind elaborating a little on that? 
 
SR: [Laughter] Well, I think he felt that they were compromising the position too 
much. We asked David Owen to get some concessions from Smith, but the 
proposed deal was not going to be freedom; it was not going to be the end of 
white rule. 
 
SO: So, it was too much of a political compromise? 
 
SR: It was too much of a compromise. 
 
SO: At that point, the Internal Settlement was protecting white minority 
political rights. White economic rights were not in any way going to be 
diluted, either, and land wouldn’t have been involved in any way? 
 
SR: No, no. 
 
SO: Ah. And there was also the whole question of the leadership of the 
security forces…yes. 
 
SR: Absolutely. So, the package as a whole – as Nyerere saw it – was a sell-out. 
 
SO: ‘Sell-out’ is a very powerful phrase in Zimbabwean politics. 
 
SR: Yes. 
 
SO: Much of the literature about Rhodesia in the 1970s emphasises the role 
of Zambia. It also emphasises the role of Tanzania. But what of 
Botswana? 
 
SR: Botswana was coming into its own, but wasn’t there yet. Remember, 
Botswana really came onto the scene with Seretse Khama, and whilst 
Seretse was there, he was the confidant of Kaunda, Nyerere and, in the early 
days, of Obote. Then, Seretse died [on 13 July 1980], and there was a kind of 
gap before the new leadership in Botswana came into its own. In that 
transition period, Botswana didn’t play a formidable role, but as the years 
went by, they came into their own. They were part of the Contact Group and 
they exercised more and more influence, and, of course, they were doing 
better economically by then. They could pull their weight more. 
 
SO: After the discovery of diamonds in 1967, yes. 
 
SR: And then, you know, things developed. SADCC was to come. 
 
SO: I’m very struck by the extent to which Botswana is a Front Line State. It 
was compromised by its geographical position – sandwiched in 
between Rhodesia/Zimbabwe and South Africa – which complicated its 
diplomacy. There was also the presence of the refugees, [and] the 
presence of armed fighters within the camps. So, this was a difficult 
diplomatic position to occupy. 
 
SR: Yes, it made it harder for them to be a Front Line State, if you like, [in the 
manner of a] Zambia or Tanzania. But there was no question where its 
loyalties lay. 
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SO: In the 1970s, were you also in close touch with Mozambique on the 
Rhodesia/Zimbabwe question? 
 
SR: When I came to the Secretariat in 1975, Arnold had already opened the door 
to Mozambique via Portugal. He had made contact with Soares and he was 
making it clear that the Commonwealth was a vehicle that had to be taken 
into account by the Portuguese – that it was ready to do business on the side 
of FRELIMO. And then Arnold’s term ended. So, I came at a very propitious 
moment. The door had been opened and then I, gradually, through the 
Contact Group, developed relations. 
 
SO: By the time that you were elected Secretary General, General Spinola 
had granted accelerated independence to each of the Portuguese 
territories in Africa. 
  
SR: That’s right. Samora Machel was on the scene. This was where my own Non-
Aligned contacts helped. And people like Burnham at home helped, because 
they knew [Machel] and could help me make contacts with them. “Sonny 
Ramphal? Yes, yes: he’s Forbes’ Foreign Minister.” 
 
SO: That reinforced your credentials? 
 
SR: Absolutely. The whole Guyana connection at that time did. 
 
SO: Did you continue to attend Non-Alignment Movement meetings? 
 
SR: No, no. 
 
SO: I just wondered…The Non-Alignment Movement meeting in Havana in 
September 1979 was held after the Lusaka CHOGM, and I wondered if 
you’d gone there. 
 
SR: I didn’t go there, but I’ll give you a funny little anecdote. Michael Manley was 
at the height of his radicalism. They had the Havana meeting and he tore up 
his prepared speech and made a hell-raising speech in support of Fidel 
Castro, who was adopting the rather absurd position that Cuba was [both] 
non-aligned and in favour of the East [Laughter] – that kind of oxymoron! 
Michael got caught in this and I got a call at the Secretariat from the airport [in 
London]. It was Julius Nyerere, going back home from Cuba, and he asked 
me to come and see him at the airport. He was changing planes, so I went up 
and he used me as a kind of battering ram to vent his anger about 
Michael…Because Julius saw that the future of non-alignment lay in non-
alignment!  
 
SO: And that meant ‘equidistance’, not leaning to one side. 
 
SR: That’s right. “Sonny, why did Michael do this?” [Laughter] – as if I was 
responsible for Michael! “This was terrible.” He ranted and raved and so on – 
“You must bring him back into line!” [Laughter] I calmed him down and said, 
“Of course, I agree with you.” I did make my own representation to Michael. I 
said, “Look, you’re losing your friends, you know. I don’t know how much 
Julius told you, but this is what he told me…And he’s got a point.” [Laughter] 
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SO: And how did that go down? 
 
SR: Oh, it went down well with Michael, because we were very good friends. 
 
SO: What you’re talking about here is the extraordinary role of personal 
networks... 
 
SR: Absolutely. 
 
SO: ...and personalities. 
 
SR: Absolutely. By then, Michael had developed a personal rapport with Malcolm 
Fraser. He had Malcolm Fraser in Jamaica, so things were happening in the 
Commonwealth at the one-to-one level – some of which I didn’t even know 
about or knew about afterwards; some of which I was involved in. But that 
personal relationship was vital, and Michael Manley was very important. 
Malcolm Fraser was very important. Mulroney was important. 
 
SO: Do you think cricket helped at all in that? 
 
SR: Yes, it did. It was the Commonwealth’s game and the Caribbean made some 
of the biggest sacrifices for it because – again, led by Guyana – the 
Caribbean was totally behind the isolation of South Africa and punished its 
own cricketers for breaking ranks. I remember Kallicharran in Guyana was 
banned [Laughter] because he went to South Africa. 
 
SO: I was thinking, also, more in the way of how a love of cricket provided a 
bond between leaders. 
 
SR: I suppose. Behind that is the love of cricket, but cricket was a vehicle through 
which they could exercise sanctions and they thought – and I agreed – that 
the sporting boycott was very significant, very important to South Africa. It 
was a tool that – in the very special circumstances of South Africa – hurt. 
 
SO: Yes. As South Africa was a ‘sports mad’ nation, sports sanctions really 
would touch their national pride. In the 1970s, there were, of course, 
other important issues which were building up steam, one of which was 
the role of the ANC within South African politics. The ANC was not yet 
the designated voice of the South African people. I’m just 
wondering…What was the particular relationship, the diplomacy, 
between the ANC and the Secretary General in the 1970s? 
 
SR: It was always as close as we could make it. That was facilitated by the fact 
that Zambia – particularly Zambia – provided the access to the ANC. My first 
meeting with Oliver Tambo was in Lusaka, where, after all, he was a guest. I 
always had a slight worry which I didn’t articulate publicly: how would the ANC 
feel about the Commonwealth and Commonwealth membership, when we 
‘won’ [Laughter], colloquially? When we got to the stage where apartheid was 
over [and] the ANC was in power, how would they feel about Commonwealth 
membership? Would they, as it were, vent their anger on Britain with an old-
fashioned notion that the Commonwealth was British – which it was when 
they went into exile? Eventually, I broached the question with Oliver in 
Lusaka. We were then close enough to be ‘Oliver’ and ‘Sonny’. I said to him in 
a reflective mood, “Oliver, how are you going to feel about Commonwealth 
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membership? Will you be ready to come back?” In that wonderful yet piercing 
way he had of looking at you, he said, “Sonny, black South Africa never left 
the Commonwealth.” Well, I was so delighted but I was flabbergasted. It was 
so profound. Why didn’t I think of that myself? [Laughter] Here was the leader 
of the ANC saying, “It’s not a question. It’s not an issue. We never left.” 
 
SO: Your soul must have expanded at that point. 
 
SR: [Laughter] It did, it did. It meant so much more in terms of the struggle. 
 
SO: Yes, it would have done: hugely important, going forward. And what of 
other people in the 1970s, such as Abdul Minty, the spokesman for the 
Anti-Apartheid Movement in Britain? 
 
SR: People like Abdul saw the Commonwealth as a friend. We had frequent 
contacts with him because, of course, he was in Europe and we had contacts 
with any of those who were able to travel. I think they all looked on us as 
genuine. We had as big a fight with the British government as they had, and 
we weren’t hiding it. 
 
SO: Do you recall whether Abdul Minty sought Commonwealth support from 
the Secretariat and the Secretary General on the question of whether or 
not South Africa had developed a nuclear weapon? When the South 
African government did achieve nuclear capability, it took the struggle 
in Southern Africa to a completely different level. 
 
SR: Yes, it did. We talked about it and, of course, the implication was that white 
South Africa had joined the nuclear club, and the obligation to support a club 
member was that much stronger so far as the Americans and the British were 
concerned. But this was very much at the personal level. We never, as I recall 
it, made it a kind of public issue. 
 
SO: Looking through the files at the Secretariat, there is one small record of 
a UN seminar [on ‘Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa’] that was 
held in February 1979. But there is no note of discussion elsewhere in 
the Secretariat files. Having found this seminar report, I thought, “Where 
else was the talk going on?” 
 
SR: It would have been between Minty and myself. 
 
SO So, it redoubled your determination? 
 
SR: Oh, absolutely. For me, there was never any question as to which way we 
had to go. I knew the mass of the Commonwealth was with me, and as 
important to me as anything else was the fact that the white Commonwealth 
as represented by Australia and Canada was with me. This was both political 
parties, and that was quite phenomenal because they didn’t have black 
communities. There were no votes in it for them: for Malcolm Fraser or for 
Bob Hawke, or for Mulroney or Trudeau. 
 
SO: So, it was determination for social justice? 
 
SR: Yes, absolutely. 
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SO: When you were Secretary General in the 1970s, how far was Uganda a 
complicating factor for the Commonwealth?  
 
SR:  It was a complicating factor because Obote had been very prominent in the 
early stages of the anti-apartheid struggle, both intellectually and politically. At 
Singapore, he was a prominent black voice. 
 
SO: And then there was the coup. 
 
SR: And then he couldn’t leave! [Laughter] 
 
SO: How did that hit the Singapore meeting? Obviously, you were there… 
 
SR: Well, it didn’t hit the conference because it happened as the conference 
ended, so it never became a factor in the conference. But what was 
complicating was the fact that Amin was so well received by Britain. The first 
capital in the Commonwealth that Amin visited was London. The first Prime 
Minister he was greeted by was Ted Heath – warmly, at Downing Street. That 
did not go down very well, and four years later the Uganda issue became a 
dominant issue at Gleneagles. It posed a very important challenge for me in 
terms of what kind of leadership should come from the Secretary General. 
You need to cast your mind back to 1975-77, when the issue of non-
interference in internal affairs was dogma. It wasn’t like now. It was dogma 
then. So, the UN wouldn’t touch Uganda. The Human Rights Commission in 
Geneva wouldn’t take it on its agenda. It was internal affairs. I took it on at 
Gleneagles and made a presentation to the Heads at the Retreat in which I 
tried to intellectualise the right to interfere. The way I dealt with it was to say 
that, “There is a line beyond which abuse of human rights and human dignity 
anywhere in the world becomes the world’s business. I don’t know how you 
draw the line, and it hasn’t been drawn yet, but there are situations when you 
know that, wherever that line is, it has been crossed, and that’s Uganda. 
However that line has been drawn, it’s been crossed. When it’s crossed, it’s 
the right of everyone – especially members of the Commonwealth – to 
condemn.” 
 
SO: How did that go down? 
 
SR: It went down pretty well, because everybody at the time wanted to square 
condemnation with maintenance of the principle of non-interference. So, you 
weren’t breaching the principle but you were saying, “It’s gone too far.” 
Without having to define what is “too far”. 
 
SO: But in strict legal terms, after all, non-interference was the basis of 
South Africa’s claim to international legality and sovereignty. 
 
SR: Absolutely, and I drew on that. 
 
SO: “We must be consistent”? 
 
SR: “We must be consistent,” and they were: they condemned Amin. It didn’t do 
much more, but it was a big step for Africa and for the Commonwealth to 
condemn the abuse of human rights in an African country. The interesting 
thing was that, two weeks later, the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva 
took the same line. They came out and condemned Amin. 
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SO: Backtracking a little bit, did condemnation in any way extend to the 
Commonwealth as a diplomatic actor taking a stance on the issue of the 
expulsion of Ugandan Asians? Or was that really a bilateral issue 
between Kampala and London? 
 
SR: No, it didn’t. 
 
SO: After this 1977 condemnation by the Commonwealth of the Amin 
regime’s human rights record, did Commonwealth diplomacy play out in 
any other way towards Uganda? 
 
SR: Yes, it did. We promoted anything that would get rid of Amin. I had a big 
struggle at that very conference – before the condemnation – with Prime 
Minister James Callaghan, because the 1977 meeting was chaired by 
Callaghan. I took the early position with Callaghan, one-to-one, of, “Don’t 
worry, Amin isn’t going to come. I’m going to see to it that he doesn’t come.” I 
didn’t know how I was going to do it, [Laughter] but my notion was that I’d get 
the Africans to make it clear to Amin that he was not welcome. 
 
SO: But Amin very definitely wanted to come. 
 
SR: Very definitely! But we put so much pressure on them, and he was such a 
consummate showman. 
 
SO: How did the ‘squeeze-play’ work? 
 
SR: [Laughter] Well, it worked through the Africans and through me, personally, 
saying that it would be very disruptive. 
 
SO: Was there one key lever? 
 
SR: [Laughter] What did count was the British making it very clear that he was not 
welcome. 
 
SO: When you say “the British”, which aspect of….? 
 
SR: It would be diplomacy – British Ambassadors, British messages from Downing 
Street… 
 
SO: Ah, okay. It wouldn’t have come from the Palace? 
 
SR: Not the palace; not the palace, at all. It would have come from Downing 
Street. And Amin gave me the impression [that], “It’s all right; I’m not going to 
come.” I, in turn, reassured Callaghan that he wasn’t coming, because 
Callaghan, by then, was terrified of the political fall-out in Britain if Amin did 
come: the fallout for him, the fallout for the Commonwealth. All went well until 
two days before the CHOGM was to open, when I got a screaming message 
from Callaghan, [asking me] to come and see him. So, I pelted over to 
Downing Street. He said, “Sonny, you told me all was going to be well! It’s not 
well! Amin is in an aeroplane over Ireland. We’re not going to give him landing 
rights. But this is now a big diplomatic incident!” I said, “Who told you he’s in 
an aeroplane?” Callaghan said, “Our intelligence sources tell us.” I said, “Well, 
I have not heard anything from Uganda, which suggests that he has left 
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Uganda and I would have thought that was likely to happen.” He said, “Look, 
I’m giving you two hours.” Until then, I had schooled him never to say, “You 
can’t come”: “This is a member of the Commonwealth. As host, you can’t say 
that to a member.” So, what he was telling me was, “I’m giving you two hours 
and then all bets are off. [Laughter] I am going to say to Amin, ‘You’re not 
going to be allowed to land’.’’ Well, it was pretty frantic. I got in touch with the 
whole of the Front Line States. They all said to me they didn’t think that he 
had left Uganda, and I reassured Callaghan that this was my information. “Be 
very careful about this message, because Amin is a showman.” Thank God, 
within two hours, it was established that he was very much in Kampala. He 
had let it be known to the press that he was coming. 
 
SO: Because that would have provoked a public declaration by the British 
Government, and then he could assume the persona of an affronted, 
excluded Commonwealth leader. 
 
SR:  And I would have been in a position where I would have had to say I couldn’t 
sanction it. 
 
SO Did you ever go to Kampala? 
  
SR: At an early stage, yes. I felt that I had to make a move as the new Secretary 
General, and I made an official visit to Uganda. I took my wife with me and 
Amin was the epitome of charm. There was no hostility emanating from him; 
he was a good Commonwealth man. He welcomed the Secretary General, he 
got my wife to open an exhibition that he was to have opened, and stood 
down so that she could do it. Then he said [that], as the centrepiece of this 
welcome, he was going to open a game park, which was something that he 
prized very highly. And he was going to name it after me: ‘The Ramphal 
Game Park’. 
 
SO: Better than a shopping centre! 
 
SR: [Laughter] He then decided he was going to fly us, himself, by helicopter, 
because this game park was about 300 miles from Kampala. 
 
SO: Did he have a helicopter pilot’s licence? 
 
SR: I’ve no idea! [Laughter] But, he flew it. My wife, Lois, was with me. We were 
terrified! 
 
SO: I bet you were! [Laughter] 
 
SR: But he flew it very competently, and we landed at this remote game park – 
then called the Queen Elizabeth Game Park. The whole diplomatic corps was 
there. I was introduced to them and I thought they were a pretty surly lot. 
They didn’t look at all happy and didn’t really greet me. Something was 
wrong! Eventually, I remember, the German ambassador took me aside and 
he said, “Look, nobody’s going to tell you if I don’t tell you, but we do this at 
least once every three months. What is more, we have to drive!” [Laughter] 
 
SO: So, you said, “Well, after that helicopter ride, I wish I had, too!” 
[Laughter] 
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SR: That’s the level of the games that Amin was up to. 
 
SO: As you say, buffoonery, but dangerous buffoonery. 
 
SR: Very, very dangerous. 
 
SO: When the civil war erupted, was the Commonwealth in any way in touch 
with Museveni’s forces, thinking ahead of what was likely to happen? 
 
SR: No, not at all. 
 
SO: Were you in any way aware of Tanzania’s particular interest in the 
outcome? 
 
SR: Oh, yes. I, like most of the Commonwealth, was pleased that Tanzania 
engaged. Although, in fact, they did cross over into Uganda and I remember 
Trudeau – again, out of principle – saying he couldn’t support Tanzania 
invading Uganda. 
 
SO: Was the Tanzanian High Commission here in London giving you 
detailed briefs about what was going on? 
 
SR: Yes. The High Commissioner, Tony Nyaki, was especially close to Julius, who 
took the right line: “We followed them across the border; we didn’t invade.” 
 
SO: So, the Ugandan army overstepped the line: a question of ‘dynamics on 
the ground’. I have one last question about the 1970s and other internal 
problems which you felt might have required a statement from you. One 
such issue was Northern Ireland. Did the Commonwealth act behind the 
headlines in any way on the Northern Ireland issue? 
 
SR: No, not until later. Not in that early stage. And I didn’t think there was any 
disposition from any quarter in the Commonwealth to act. 
 
SO: But, the 1980s, in the run up to the Anglo-Irish agreement… 
 
SR: Yes, I made a visit to Northern Ireland. 
 
SO: Were you invited or was this on your own initiative? 
 
SR: Well, I wanted to go, and then I got invited to make a speech. I went – with 
the blessing of the Foreign Office – and made my reconciliation speech. 
 
SO: Were the Secretary General’s ‘good offices’ used in any way? 
 
SR: No. Again, it was Britain: this was a domestic matter. I don’t think Britain 
wanted the Commonwealth to get involved at all. 
 
SO: But did Ireland want the Commonwealth involved? 
 
SR: No, no. 
 
SO: Ireland seems to have paid particular attention to the Commonwealth 
since its withdrawal in 1949. 
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SR: Later on, in the days of Garrett FitzGerald, I had personal contacts with him 
and that was his disposition. 
 
SO: But in the 1970s and 80s, leading up to the Anglo-Irish agreement, this 
was not an encouraged role on your side? 
 
SR: No, no. 
 
SO: Sir Sonny, thank you very much indeed. If I could come back to you 
again to continue this discussion, that would be excellent. 
 
 
 [END OF AUDIOFILE PART ONE] 
